

28 October 2024



A CHINESE WAY OF WAR AND PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY TODAY

OPENING REMARKS:

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Director, Cultural and Area Studies Office, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

DATE:

Mon, 28 Oct, 2024

TIME:

1300 - 1500 (CST)

LOCATION:

Arnold Conf. Room, Lewis and Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS

All welcome for the audience.

For outstations, the event will be available live on CGSC's Facebook page at:

https://www.facebook.com/USACGSC









A Chinese Way of War and People's Liberation Army Today



Dr. Geoff Babb

Department of Military History
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Presentation for the Cultural and Area Studies Office U.S. Army Command and General Staff College



China's Modern Military History: The Past is Prologue For the PLA Today





Dr. Geoff Babb, Department of Military History US Army Command and General Staff College



China Map of National Humiliation (1938)



Emperor Xi of the Mao Dynasty (2013-2028?) Emulating the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)



A New Golden Age (BRI), a Treasure Fleet (Merchant & Military), and a Restored Wall (A2AD)



Xi Jinping: The Party Centenary Speech 1 July 2021

The country endured intense humiliation, the people were subjected to great pain, and the **Chinese civilization was** plunged into darkness. Since that time, national rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.



The Goals of National Rejuvenation and the Century of Humiliation



The Hundred Years of Humiliation: A Key Driver of PLA Modernization



1st Opium War (1839-1842)

Taiping Rebellion (1854-1865)

2nd Opium War (1854-1860)

Sino-French War (1884-1885)

1st Sino-Japanese War (**1894-1895**)

The Boxer Rebellion (1900-1901)

Revolution, Warlords, & Civil War (1911-1945)

2nd Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)

Civil War Part 2 (1945-1949)

Establishment of the PRC (1949)









Protecting the Borders & Consolidating Gains: The Conflicts of the PRC, 1950-1989

The Korean War (1950-1953)

1st & 2nd Taiwan Straits Crises (1954 & 1958)

Tibet Crisis (1959)

Sino-Indian Border Conflict (1962)

Sino-Soviet Border Clash (1969)

Seizure of the Paracels (1974)

Sino-Vietnam War (1979)







Taiwan Unification: A Key Driver of PLA Operations Today

White Paper: The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era August 2024





I. Taiwan Is Part of China - This Is an Indisputable Fact II.Resolute Efforts of the CPC to Realize China's Complete Reunification

III.China's Complete Reunification Is a Process That Cannot Be Halted

IV. National Reunification in the New Era

V. Bright Prospects for Peaceful Reunification



People's Liberation Army Ground Force



LTC Jason Halub Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, KS

Presentation for the Cultural and Area Studies Office U.S. Army Command and General Staff College






The People's Liberation
Army – Army (PLA-A)
Modernization Efforts
&
A Chinese Way of War






Proximity to Politics
























Northern Western PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY **Theater Commands (TC)** Central The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a historically army-centric organization, and for years bureaucratic intransigence limited their ability to transform into a modern joint force. Southern In 2016, China enacted major reforms to organization and operations that included the most comprehensive restructuring of forces in its history. The purpose of these reforms is to create a more mobile, modular, lethal ground force capable of being the core of joint operations and able to "fight and win wars."

Professionalization

People's Liberation Army Army (PLAA)

Theater Command (TC) Group Armies







Flattening the corps-level command structure with TC reforms, anticipates faster communications both horizontally among joint force elements and vertically up the command chain. TC branches report to two entities-their TC and HQ. For example, the Western TC Army reports to the TC and PLAA HQ.







Operational Principles







Making Sense of a Chinese Way of War





China's Air and Space Force



Dr. John H. Modinger USAF (Ret), Associate Professor School of Advanced Military Studies Fort Leavenworth, KS

Presentation for the Cultural and Area Studies Office U.S. Army Command and General Staff College





The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Its Space Efforts

... are rapidly closing the capabilities gap

with the United States







Recent developments ...



- Developing cutting-edge technologies—including stealth fighters, new aircraft, and airborne warning and control systems
- Working on a 6th generation fighter; prototype expected by maybe 2028, design by late 2030s
- Y-20 airlifter ... note the <u>routine similarities in Chinese design with its earlier American design</u> (they steal everything that isn't locked down)
- Electro-magnetic catapult for use on 3rd aircraft carrier and beyond (mirrors Ford Class innovation)
- Digital transformation; modernizing its IT systems to transform PLA organizations, processes, and cultures
- Covert recruitment of Western air combat trainers (underscores a lack of confidence in own trainers), i.e. the "grey beard strategy."
- The US is beginning to drop the word "near" as in "near peer threat" or "pacing threat"



Other developments ...



- Number of Chinese surveillance satellites has <u>tripled since 2018</u> to 359; since 2015, 550% satellite increase (848 vs. 129)
- Perspective: US has a total of 6,975 operational satellites today (8x as many as China) and since 2015, total
 US satellites have increased by over 2100%
- So why are military leaders so concerned? <u>Lines are blurred</u> between Chinese military, civil, and commercial; same <u>not true for US</u> where vast majority (94%) are commercial.
- The US just has 300 military and intelligence satellites in operation—roughly a third of China's total space assets.
- US <u>not fully leveraging innovation</u> in its own commercial sector; Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR) is a step in the right direction; parallels Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) concept used only three times since created about 75 years ago.
- In 2023, the <u>US commercial sector—the envy of the world</u>—launched (not including government missions) **3X as** many satellites as the rest of the world combined, and US effective launch capability for **4X** the rest of the world combined.



Recommendations ...



- Beijing has been strategically leveraging its massive regional missile capabilities to potentially neutralize major US air bases and ports in the region; our current strategy's reliance on a select few bases and ports strikes this onlooker as a dubious gamble.
- China has long had a problem producing quality engines for its fighter aircraft. It appears they are
 energetically solving that deficit. Given current production numbers, China could soon have the world's
 largest Air Force to compliment its already having the largest Navy (in numbers, not displacement)
- China is <u>not ahead of the US in space</u>. But the military and intelligence communities are falling behind the commercial space sector and losing ground to China.
- We need to do a better job unleashing the potential of the Space Force. The best way to do that is to capitalize on what's already working.
- While we have a sizeable lead in space, China is galloping ahead copying our technology and countering our innate advantages.



China's Maritime forces, PLA Navy, Coast Guard, and the Militia



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Chinese Way of War? Maritime



Maritime Forces

- Navy (PLAN)

Coast Guard approx

- Militias



"The First law of war is to preserve yourself and destroy your enemy."



Mao Zedong





Historical Context



Mostly River Wars

Sino-Japanese War

Paracels and Spratly's

Neo-Jeune Ecole



Chinese Way of War? Maritime



- Maritime Forces
 - Navy (PLAN) 370 (221 US)
 - Coast Guard approx. 50 "blue water" OOA
 - Militias hundreds?/purpose built

Don't forget

- PLAAF/shorebased missile batteries





Questions / Answers / Comments



Organization and Capabilities
























































































Source documents provide guidance for training in three broad areas.

- **1. Core Cultural Competencies**: Core cultural competencies include areas such as understanding culture, applying organizational awareness, cultural perspective taking, and cultural adaptability
- Regional/Technical Competencies: Regional/technical competencies deal with applying regional information and operating in a regional environment.
- Leader/Influence Functions: Leader/influence functions include strategic (cultural) agility, (cultural) systems
 thinking, cross-cultural influences, organizational cultural competence, and utilizing interpreters/advisors.
 CJCSI 1800.01D (Officer PME Policy) and CJCSI 1805.01A (Enlisted PME Policy)





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