

21 March 2023



CHINESE LEADERSHIP'S INCREASED POWERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY

OPENING REMARKS: Dr. Jack D. Kem-

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MODERATOR:

DR. MAHIR J. IBRAHIMOV (DR. I.)-

Director, Cultural and Area Studies Office (CASO), CGSC

DATE:

Tues, 21 March, 2023

TIME:

1300 - 1500 (CST)

LOCATION:

Arnold Conf. Room, Lewis and Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS

All welcome for the audience.
For outstations, the event will be available live on CGSC's Facebook page at:
https://www.facebook.com/USACGSC and Video teleconference (VTC)




China's and Russia's Concepts of Global Governance



- •China's Sino-centrist worldview and outlook on global governance—the rules, norms, and institutions that regulate international cooperation.
- Parallels with similar Russian socio-cultural and historical concepts.
- •Both countries behavior at home and international arena might be driven to some extent by those factors, also creating the temporary conditions of a 'marriage of convenience.'
- •In the past two decades, China has reemerged as a major power, with the world's second largest economy and advanced military.
- •It increasingly asserts itself, seeking to regain its centrality in the international system and over global governance institutions*
- •Main takeaways from President Xi's speech after reelection.

^{* 2023} Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed on 16 March 2023 at: https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/

Most Powerful Economies in the World 1980-2026



^{*}International Monetary Fund Database, Global Stats, July 2021. Accessed on 17 March 2023 at: https://youtu.be/gmOnUSE6vjQ



Chinese Leadership's Increased Powers: Implications for Global Security



Mr. Russell Hsiao Executive Director Global Taiwan Institute

Washington, DC.



Presentation for the Cultural and Area Studies Office U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

21 March 2023 unclassified







XI JINPING

- XJP broke CCP succession norms to take his 3rd term as general secretary.
- XJP the most powerful CCP leader since MZD
- XJP filled the top echelons of the PBSC/PB with loyalists



XI JINPING'S 20TH CCP PARTY CONGRESS SPEECH

"Peaceful Reunification, One Country, Two Systems"

 "One Country, Two Systems" enshrined in CCP's Constitution

Refusal to renounce the use of military force

• "will never promise to renounce the use of force."

"One-China Principle, 1992 Consensus"

Oppose Taiwan
 Independence, Advance
 Cross-Strait Unification

Protect Against "External Interference" and "Taiwan separatists"

 Aimed at the United States and DPP





KEY PBSC/CMC TAIWAN-RELATED PERSONNEL

Wang Huning

- 4th ranking PBSC,
- Chairman, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
- Deputy Director, Central Affairs Leading Small Group on Taiwan

General He Weidong

- Commander, Eastern Theater Command (From late 2019 to early 2022)
- Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command and Commander of the Western Theater Command Army
- Fujian-based army unit when Xi was Party Secretary of Fujian



WILLIAM BURNS – CIA DIRECTOR

"I think we need to take very seriously Xi's ambitions with regard to ultimately controlling Taiwan. That doesn't, however, in our view, mean that a military conflict is inevitable. We do know, as has been made public, that President Xi has instructed the PLA, the Chinese military leadership, to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan, but that doesn't mean that he's decided to invade in 2027 or any other year as well. I think our judgment at least is that President Xi and his military leadership have doubts today about whether they could accomplish that invasion."

(CBS Face the Nation, February 26, 2023)








POLITICAL/HYBRID WARFARE

- Military gray zone activities
- Political subversion through political warfare/United Front tactics
- Information operations through propaganda and disinformation
- Containing Taiwan's diplomatic and international space
- Non-military gray zone coercion (limited to Coast Guard, Maritime Militia)
- Drone/UUV
- Economic warfare and cyber
- Traditional espionage and hostage diplomacy







TIMELINE

"Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakable commitment. It is also a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation and a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."

Xi Jinping



China-DPRK Relations in the Era of U.S.-China Rivalry





Dr. Seong-Hyon Lee Senior Fellow, George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations. Visiting Scholar, Harvard Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies

Presentation for the Cultural and Area Studies Office
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College



Conclusion first



• Amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry that has now expanded from the economic, military arena to the ideological realm, the strategic importance of "socialist North Korea" (as the Chinese President Xi Jinping put it) to China is bound to deepen.



Implanting Xi Jinping's 'socialism' on Kim Jong-un



- During their fifth summit, which was held in Pyongyang in June, 2019, Xi told Kim "The 'essential mark' of China-DPRK relations lies in being a socialist state led by the Communist Party." He added that common ideal beliefs and struggle goals are the driving force behind North Korea-China relations.
- Xi Jinping's special emphasis on "socialism" in his meetings with Kim was something Chinese scholars also took notice.
- In response, Kim said "I have confirmed with the general secretary [Xi] that adhering to the socialist system is the key to maintaining the North Korea-China friendship."



Analysis



- Xi's repeated emphasis on socialism, mixed with Cold War-fraternity la nguages, intended for arousing emotional bonding, through a series of multiple summits, appeared to have the effect of "indoctrination" over Kim. In a sense, the five back-to-back summits could be seen as five sessions by Xi to have Kim bleached in the socialism indoctrination.
- During the fifth and final summit, Kim said "Socialism is the unchangin g essence of the DPRK-China friendship," adding confessionally, "I once again confirm the truth, which is that the DPRK-China friendship is unique and invincible as it adheres to and glorifies socialism." Chinese Foreign Ministry. June 2018.



Xi's influence over Kim was even "noticeable" by Trump



 Kim was initially seen very eager for a summit opportunity with the U.S. president. However, he became cautious and vigilant as the Singapore summit date approached. Noticing the evident "change" in Kim's attitude, Trump publicly suspected that Xi was pulling strings behind Kim. "When Kim Jong-un had the meeting with President Xi, in China, the second meeting, I think there was a little change in attitude from Kim Jong-un. So, I don't like that," Trump said, repeating, "I don't like that."



After summit with Xi...



 After summit with Xi, North Korea's Kim said, North Korea and China would work together as "one unified command center" in dealing with international affairs.



Kim Jong-un declared, "It's a new Cold War."



• Kim Jong-un said during a parliamentary meeting in September 2021: "The international relations have been reduced to the structure of 'neo-Cold War."



Recap: Xi Jinping's "Cold War wooing" to Kim Jong-un



• Kim Jong-un and Chinese leader Xi Jinping held five rounds of summits in the 2018-2019 period, during which Xi characterized the two socialist countries' relationship as "sealed in blood," and as close as the "lips and teeth"—the two most iconic phrases from the Cold War era to denote the China-North Korea relationship.



Future prospect of China-North Korea Relations



- Looking ahead, as the U.S.-China rivalry deepens, China will shield North Korea from international economic sanctions and will tolerate North Korea's nuclear and missile improvement, as long as North Korea's armament is aimed at the United States and its allies.
- With the Cold War set in, Pyongyang and Beijing have resolved their strategic ambiguity, as they now have their clear common adversary.
- Amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry that has now expanded from the economic, military arena to the ideological realm, the strategic importance of "socialist North Korea" (as the Chinese President Xi Jinping put it) to China is bound to deepen.



Evolution of Russo-Chinese relations: From Rivalry to a 'Marriage of Convenience'



Dr. Sean Kalic,
Professor, Department of Military History
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

Presentation for the Cultural and Area Studies Office U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Sino-Soviet Relations: A Historical Perspective









• A New Communist Era: 1945-1950

• A Communist Bloc for the Cold War: 1950-1959

• A Withering Alliance: 1960-1984

• A Changing Geopolitical Environment: 1985-1989



Chinese Leadership's Increased Powers: Implications for Global Security



Dr. Joseph Babb
Professor, Department of Military History
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

Presentation for the Cultural and Area Studies Office U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

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From Enemy to Friend and Back Again: The Evolution of Sino-American Relations from Mao to Xi





Enemy to Friend: The Mao Years (1949-1976)

Friend to Responsible Stakeholder: Deng et al (1978-2014)

Collaborator to Competitor: Xi Jinping (2012-Present)

Competitor to Enemy: Xi Jinping et al (2023-2049)





Enemy to Friend: The Mao Years (1949-1976)





- The Korean War, 1950-53
- Taiwan Strait Crises, 1954 and 1958
- Tibetan Uprising, 1959
- Sino-India War, 1962
- China Atomic Bomb Test, 1964
- China's Support to North Vietnam, 1949-75
- Sino-Soviet Border Incident, 1969
- The Nixon Visit to China, 1972



Friend to Responsible Stakeholder: Deng et al (1978-2014)





- Formal Recognition, 1979
- The Sino-Vietnamese War, 1979
- Tiananmen Square Massacre, 1989
- Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1995-96
- Embassy Bombing Serbia, 1999
- Normalized Trade Relations, 1999
- EP-3 Incident Hainan Island, 2001
- US Pivot to Asia, 2011





Collaborator to Competitor: Xi Jinping (2012-Present)






- US Indicts Chinese Hackers, 2014
- US Warning of South China Sea Military Build-up, 2015
- Trump Hosts Xi at Mar-a-Lago, 2017
- Trump Imposes Tariffs on China, 2018
- The Huawei Controversy, 2018-19
- US Supports Hong Kong Protesters, 2019
- Covid Tensions, 2020
- The Uyghur Genocide, 2021
- Taiwan Strait Crisis and the War in the Ukraine, 2022-23







Strategic Competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national Security is the PRC's coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences. The PRC seeks to undermine U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Region....The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department.

Competitor to Enemy? (2023-2049)





I Look forward to your Questions and Comments





China's Leadership:

Mao Zedong (1935-1976)

Hua Guofeng (1976-1981)

Deng Xiaoping (1978-1997)

Hu Yaobang (1981-1987)

Zhao Ziyang (1987-1989)

Jiang Zemin (1989-2002)

Hu Jintao (2002-2012)

Xi Jinping (2012-)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/24/mao-zedong-xi-jinping-china-leaders/https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations





Questions/Answers/Comments

Organization and Capabilities



Source documents provide guidance for training in three broad areas.

- Core Cultural Competencies: Core cultural competencies include areas such as understanding culture, applying organizational awareness, cultural
 perspective taking, and cultural adaptability.
- 2) Regional/Technical Competencies: Regional/technical competencies deal with applying regional information and operating in a regional environment.
- Leader/Influence Functions: Leader/influence functions include strategic (cultural) agility, (cultural) systems thinking, cross-cultural influences, organizational cultural competence, and utilizing interpreters/advisors.

CJCSI 1800.01D (Officer PME Policy) and CJCSI 1805.01A (Enlisted PME Policy).



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YouTube link: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLkGvnfy3IadNRMPT-sNHpAsz8a3npWBH8

Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/USACGSC