



15 September 2022



STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES OF CHINA, NORTH KOREA AND INDIA TOWARDS RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT

OPENING REMARKS:

BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID C. FOLEY-

Deputy Commander - Education, Provost - Army University,
Deputy Commandant - CGSC, US Army Combined Arms Center

PANEL MEMBERS:

MR. PETER WOOD-

Foreign Military Studies Office, TRADOC G2, (China perspective)

LTC JOSHUA STEPHENSON-

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, (India Perspective)

DR. JAMES E. PLATTE-

School of Advanced Military Studies, (North Korea Perspective)

MODERATOR:

DR. MAHIR J. IBRAHIMOV (DR. I.)-

Director, Cultural and Area Studies Office (CASO), CGSC

DATE:

Thur. Sept 15, 2022

TIME:

1300 - 1500 (CST)

LOCATION:

Arnold Conf. Room,
Lewis and Clark Center,
Fort Leavenworth, KS


All welcome for the audience.

For outstations, the event will be available live on
CGSC's Facebook page at:
<https://www.facebook.com/USACGSC>
and Video teleconference (VTC)

Funding Boost

China and India's spending on Russian energy imports this year has doubled

2021 (cumulative) 2022 (cumulative)



Source: China Customs; India trade ministry

Note: Combined China and India imports of Russian oil, gas and coal in US dollars

Bloomberg



UNCLASSIFIED



China's Perspective on the War in Ukraine

Peter Wood

Foreign Military Studies Office

This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

September 2022



Outline

- 1. China's Interests in Ukraine**
- 2. China-Russia Relations**
- 3. The CCP & PLA are Learning Organizations**
- 4. Lessons from the War**



China's Interests in Ukraine

Uncomfortable Spectator

- Established relations in 1992, rising to level of 'Strategic Partnership'
- Strong trade relations, mostly industrial and agricultural goods
- **January:** Xi Jinping called President Zelensky to commemorate 30th anniversary of relations

Bilateral trade (2019): \$12.75B

PRC Direct Investment: \$150m

Citizens Present (2/2022): 6,000

Ukrainian Technical Assistance Has Been Vital To PRC Military Modernization

- Chinese AEW&C & Y-20 strategic cargo aircraft programs appear to have received key assistance from Ukrainian aerospace engineers
- Chinese companies have aggressively pursued Ukrainian aeroengine technology
- China appears to have significantly benefitted from Ukrainian missile/rocket technology

Chinese commentators assess that Russia cannot be abandoned due to its importance as a partner in global competition with the U.S.



UNCLASSIFIED



China-Russia Relations

- 1992 — Agreement on military technology cooperation
- 1994 — Establish “constructive partnership”
- 1996 — Establish “strategic partnership of coordination for the 21st century”
- 2001 — Sign Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship
- 2003 — Begin holding joint military exercises
- 2011 — Establish “Strategic Coordinated Partnership”
- 2017 — Begin “Joint Sea” exercise series
- 2019 — Upgrade relations to “New-era Sino-Russian comprehensive strategic coordinated partnership”
Annual joint bomber patrols begin
- 2022 — Issue Joint Statement firmly supporting each other's core interests, national sovereignty and territorial integrity

UNCLASSIFIED



The CCP & PLA are Learning Organizations

CCP leadership regularly holds study sessions to expose themselves to new technologies, ideas and social approaches

- *Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, quantum technology programs appear to have come out of these meetings^{1,2}*

The PLA carefully studies all recent conflicts from the Falklands to Syria

- *Observations of these conflicts have helped shape modern PLA*
- *Regards study as way to leapfrog generations of equipment and tactics*



China will likely be more resistant to non-kinetic and economic tools; PLA is seeing a 'preview' of the impact of Western military training and support.



How do you study China's lessons from an ongoing conflict?

Combine reviews of:

Direct commentaries on Russian military, economic performance

Prior analysis of Russian military performance in other conflicts

Authoritative Chinese documents on how they plan to fight

Coverage of military exercises conducting related types of operations

Lessons Learned



China's Lessons from the War in Ukraine

Strategic

- Ukrainian success with partners shaping global opinion, implications for Taiwan
- Necessity of 'economic hardening' to insulate PRC from the West
 - *China already taking actions to improve resiliency of its economy*
 - *IO is a fundamental part of the CCP and PLA's approach to conflict*

Operational & Tactical

- Greater use of fires needed to shape conflict in initial stages
- Lack of visible "joint" Russian actions, War dominated by ground forces
- Poorly equipped at the tactical level; lack of UAV integration, availability of night vision, tactical proficiency and discipline
 - *China unlikely to face significant issues with PGM magazine depth due to industry expansion, adoption of many new systems¹*
 - *China has placed major emphasis on realism, large-scale, intra-regional and joint combined exercises since ~2014.²*

In several areas Chinese capabilities already outmatch Russia



LTC Joshua Stephenson
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS



Presentation for the
Cultural and Area Studies Office
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College



Context is Critical

- A Nonaligned Policy and Strategic Autonomy
- India-Soviet/Russian relationship depth
- U.S.-India relations
- Reality matters
 - Territorial disputes and security challenges
 - Economic considerations
 - Indian domestic support
 - Areas for international cooperation



“Limitless opportunities and many challenges”



Russia-Ukraine War: (View from Pyongyang)



Dr. James E. Platte
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

Presentation for the
Cultural and Area Studies Office
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

15 September 2022

unclassified

Deterrence

Top strategic goal is Kim dynasty stability

- Going back to Kim Il Sung, nuclear weapons viewed as ultimate guarantor of regime stability
 - Confirmed by wars in Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine
- Military capability of US-ROK alliance is main external threat to regime stability
 - Develop delivery systems to hold targets in South Korea, Japan, and mainland United States at risk
- Only can rely on independent deterrent capability
 - Chinese response to war in Ukraine adds to suspicions of Beijing's intentions and reliability



Compellence (or if Deterrence Fails...)

Top strategic dream is reunification under Kim dynasty rule

- Pyongyang unsatisfied with the status quo and seeks a more advantageous political arrangement on the Korean Peninsula
- Could military threats, including nuclear threats, compel the United States to abandon South Korea?
- If war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula,
 - Does Russia show how deterrent threats can keep Western powers from intervening?
 - Does Ukraine show how highly-motivated lesser powers can combat great powers?
 - Does the war in Ukraine show US commitment to allies facing aggression?



EXTRA Benefits

The war in Ukraine:

- Distracts attention and resources away from East Asia
 - Less US focus on North Korea's strategic initiatives
- Gives Pyongyang a chance to gain favor of Moscow
 - Opportunities for money-making ventures in Russia and eastern Ukraine
 - Increased Russian trade or assistance to North Korea
 - Russia unlikely to enforce sanctions on North Korea
 - Diplomatic support in exchange for North Korean support for Russia at UN
- Provides a new anti-US talking point in North Korean propaganda





Questions/Answers/Comments

Organization and Capabilities



Source documents provide guidance for training in three broad areas.

- 1) **Core Cultural Competencies:** Core cultural competencies include areas such as understanding culture, applying organizational awareness, cultural perspective taking, and cultural adaptability.
- 2) **Regional/Technical Competencies:** Regional/technical competencies deal with applying regional information and operating in a regional environment.
- 3) **Leader/Influence Functions:** Leader/influence functions include strategic (cultural) agility, (cultural) systems thinking, cross-cultural influences, organizational cultural competence, and utilizing interpreters/advisors.

CJCSI 1800.01D (Officer PME Policy) and CJCSI 1805.01A (Enlisted PME Policy).



Contact:

Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov

Director, Cultural & Area Studies Office (CASO)

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC)

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2300

Phone: (913) 684-3345

CASO website: <https://armyuniversity.edu/cgsc/caso/caso.aspx>

YouTube link: <https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLkGvnfy3ladNRMPT-sNHpAsz8a3npWBH8>

Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/profile/100064811140230/search/?q=caso>